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Abstract
We examine the nature of stated subjective probabilities in a com-
plex, evolving context in which participants are not told what the ac-
tual probability is: we collect information on subjective expectations
in a computerized car race game wherein participants must bet on a
particular car but cannot influence the odds of winning once the race
begins. In our setup, the actual probability of the good outcome (a
win) can be determined based on computer simulations from any point
in the process. We compare this actual probability to the subjective
probability stated by participants at three different points in each of
six races. In line with previous research in which participants have
direct access to actual probabilities, we find that the inverse S-shaped
curve relating subjective to actual probabilities is also evident in our
far more complex situation, and that there is only a limited degree of
learning through repeated play. We show that the model in the inverse
S-shaped function family that provides the best fit to our data is Pr-
elec’s (1998) conditional invariant model. We also find that individuals
who report a greater degree of ambiguity are more pessimistic and less
responsive to actual changes in real probabilities.
Keywords: behavioral economics, expected utility theory, experi-
ments, expectations, probabilities
JEL classification: D40, L10
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Although its empirical picture has come into focus, the weighting
function has remained a somewhat tricky object to analyze—at
least in comparison with the utility function . . .Overall, it does
not look like a shape that one would draw unless compelled by
strong empirical evidence. (Prelec 2000, p. 67)
1 Introduction
The quality of human judgment has been comprehensively explored in vari-
ous disciplines, including psychology, management, and economics. The vast
literature on non-expected utility theory (see Starmer 2000, Starmer 2004,
for a review) originated in the persistent inability of rational models of be-
havior (von Neumann, J. & Morgenstern 1947) to predict choice behavior in
experiments (Camerer & Loewenstein 2004) which spawned a cottage indus-
try of experiments to tease out individuals’ cognitive biases.
One prominent finding from this literature is that even when told the
actual probabilities associated with outcomes, individuals behave as though
other probabilities apply. Early experimental work by Preston & Baratta
(1948), for example, identified an inverse S-shaped function in which subjec-
tive (psychologically-mediated) probabilities exceed objective (mathemati-
cal) probabilities, p, at low values of p, but fall short of objective probabili-
ties at high values of p. Preston & Baratta’s (1948) core proposal was that
the crossing point in their experimental data—the point at which the sub-
jective and objective probabilities were equal—was a function of an initial
anchoring level, which itself may relate to inherent psychological or physio-
logical attributes and an individual’s initial position (p. 191-192). In their
experiment, the inverse S-shape was not only visible in student data but also
in data capturing the behavior of faculty of mostly professorial rank in the
fields of mathematics, statistics, and psychology: participants who presum-
ably were well-acquainted with probability theory. Subsequent work by Dale
(1959) also reported that experimental participants tend to overestimate low
probabilities and underestimate high probabilities.
Since then, a raft of theories—including prospect theory (Kahneman &
Tversky 1979), rank-dependent utility theory (Quiggin 1982, Yaari 1987,
Schmeidler 1989, Wakker 1994), adaptive probability theory (Martins 2006),
and conditional small world theory (Chew & Sagi 2008)—have proposed spe-
cific cognitive decision rules regarding how subjective probabilities are de-
rived from objective ones. Contrary to expected utility (EU) theory, however,
these approaches treat actual probabilities as nonlinear inputs to subjective
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probabilities. Moreover, despite being axiomatically based, each has become
associated with a particular probability-weighting function that relates the
subjective probability ps to the true probability p. These weighting functions
can accommodate the psychophysics of diminishing sensitivity, wherein the
marginal impact of a stimulus diminishes with increasing distance from a ref-
erence point (Tversky & Kahneman 1992, Camerer 1995, Fox & See 2003).
They can also allow for affective aspects of the decision process, such as hope
(when contemplating high-probability losses) or fear (when contemplating
low-probability losses); emotionally richer decision-making settings, for ex-
ample, may give rise to more pronounced inverse S-shapes (Rottenstreich &
Hsee 2001, Trepel, Craig & Poldrack 2005).
1.1 Broader context and contribution
A key methodological divide in work examining subjective probability for-
mation concerns whether participants have direct access to objective prob-
abilities. One branch of literature aims to estimate a probability weighting
function based on informing individuals of an outcome’s true probability, and
then observing their choice behavior (see, e.g., Abdellaoui, Baillon, Placido &
Wakker 2011, Kilka & Weber 2001, Gonzalez & Wu 1999). Such studies were
criticized by Fox & Tversky (1998): ‘Although most empirical studies have
employed risky prospects, where probabilities are assumed to be known, vir-
tually all real-world decisions (with the notable exception of games of chance)
involve uncertain prospects (e.g., investments, litigation, insurance) where
this assumption does not hold. In order to model such decisions we need
to extend the key features of the risky weighting function to the domain of
uncertainty’ (p. 880). In a similar vein, Abdellaoui et al. (2011) state,‘[i]n
many situations we do not know the probabilities of uncertain events that
are relevant for the outcomes of our decisions’ (p. 695). Simply put, in the
real world people typically face decisions characterized by partial knowledge
of the consequences of their actions (Tversky & Fox 1995). However, em-
pirical tests in real-world situations are fraught with identification problems
(Gilboa, Postlewaite & Schmeidler 2008). Lab experiments offer more con-
trol, though they have been criticized as somewhat artificial (Winkler 1991).
In this paper, we confront participants with scenarios whose complexity
and uncertainty mimics those aspects of real-life decision-making contexts,
in which the actual probability of success is not within individuals’ feasi-
ble information set. We then estimate the probability weighting function
using data drawn from repeatedly asking individuals for their estimates of
the probability of a good outcome. While it is not impossible to correctly
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ascertain the actual probability of a good outcome, it is extremely difficult.
Hence, as with many economic problems, probabilities are not truly given
(see Gilboa et al. 2008). The objective probabilities we use are drawn from
computer simulations of how each uncertain situation, on average, will play
out from the point in time at which subjective probabilities are elicited.
The quality of people’s assessments, their abilities, and the limits of their
functioning in uncertain environments are all of theoretical and applied im-
portance (Lichtenstein & Fischhoff 1977). We contribute to the literature
examining people’s intuitive judgements of likelihood (Gilovich, Griffin &
Kahneman 2002), estimating the probability weighting function in the case
of uncertainty (see, e.g., Tversky & Wakker 1995, Fox & Tversky 1998, Kilka
&Weber 2001, Holt & Smith 2009, Wakker 2010, Abdellaoui et al. 2011, Bail-
lon, Cabantous & Wakker 2012). We also contribute to a broader literature
on the relationship between subjective probabilities and actual outcomes
(see, e.g., Manski 2004, Hurd 2009, Carman & Kooreman 2014, Brenner,
Koehler & Rottenstreich 2002). Overall, studies using survey data dominate
this literature (de Palma, Andre, Brownstone, Holt, Magnac, McFadden,
Moffat, Picard, Train, Wakker & Walker 2008). In our paper, by contrast,
we construct an adaptation for the experimental laboratory of a race car
game, in which participants must bet on the race’s ultimate outcome, which
cannot be influenced once the game is underway. We ask participants several
times during each race what they think the odds are of their chosen car win-
ning the race. Our set-up is thus dynamic—like the few existing papers (e.g.
Cheung 2001) that examine dynamic, probabilistic processes over time—and
allows us to monitor how agents update their probability expectations as a
risky situation unfolds. This is an important feature of the study, as many
interesting decision-making problems are dynamic in nature (Winkler 1991).
Further, as Machina & Schmeidler (1992) point out (p. 746), “. . . real-world
uncertainty seldom presents itself in terms of exogenously specified probabil-
ities, but rather, as alternative ‘events’ or ‘states of nature,’ so that instead
of well-defined objective probability distributions, the objects of choice are
typically ‘bets’ or ‘acts’ . . . ”. A bet on the outcome of an uncertain event—a
choice that we examine in our study—is in other words a more typical object
of choice in the real world than a choice between options that involve known
objective probabilities.
The main novelty of our study compared to previous literature is in our
repeated elicitation of subjective probabilities of a focal event dynamically,
as the event draws closer, in a setting where the objective probability of the
event is unknown to the participant but known to us as researchers. In this
dynamic environment, we examine both the determinants of subjective prob-
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abilities and the relation of subjective probabilities to objective probabilities,
sequentially fitting four different structural models of subjective probability
formation that have been proposed in the literature—all of which accommo-
date the stylized inverse S-shape. We check the validity of our elicited sub-
jective probabilities by comparing them against a set of incentivized choices
made at the same moments that subjective probabilities are elicited. Par-
ticipants may choose at these moments whether or not to pull out of the
game, where pulling out involves recouping a fraction of their bet for sure
rather than letting the race run its course and risking the loss of their whole
bet. This check also allows us to determine whether stated probabilities have
information value in terms of actual decisions featuring a trade-off between
payoffs known now with certainty, versus risky future outcomes (de Palma
et al. 2008). Such choices are exemplified in the TV game show Deal Or
No Deal, in which the trade-off is between a safe option (receiving a sum
of money for certain) and an opportunity to win more or less (e.g., Post, J.
& Assem 2008, Bombardini & Trebbi 2012, Mulino, Scheelings, Brooks &
Faff 2009, de Roos, N. & Sarafidis 2010, Deck, Lee & Reyes 2008, Botti &
Conte 2008, Blavatskyy & Pogrebna 2008, de Palma et al. 2008, Andersen,
Harrison, Lau & Rutström 2013). We avoid the danger that risk aversion
will lead individuals to misrepresent their probability perceptions and there-
fore contaminate the data (Andersen, Harrison, Lau & Rutström 2010) by
separating their choice behavior from their stated probabilities, and only in-
centivizing the former (for a recent evaluation of different belief elicitation
methods, see Schlag, Tremewan & van der Weele 2015). Opinions differ on
whether or not to use incentives for belief elicitation. We choose to keep de-
cisions and evaluation processes as low as possible in cognitive load, noting
that participants in our setting have no incentive to misreport their subjec-
tive probabilities.1 The stability of the results we obtain over time, and the
consistency of our results with other studies in other contexts, signal that
misunderstandings or careless reporting are not first-order concerns in our
context, despite the complexity of the task.
Our study design also includes a consideration of ambiguity, measured as
the degree of confidence participants have in each of their stated subjective
probabilities. This allows us to add to a growing literature that explores
learning under ambiguity (Epstein & Schneider 2007) and that has called
for more realistic models of the way beliefs are formed and the way they are
1Such incentives arise, for example, in experiments where participants can use stated
beliefs to justify their (selfish) behavior (e.g., dictator games, public good games and trust
games (Schlag et al. 2015)).
5
updated (Gilboa et al. 2008). There is a strong demand for experimental
research in choice situations involving ambiguity (de Palma et al. 2008). By
measuring the evolution of ambiguity, we are able to see the degree to which
it changes, and how the relation between subjective and objective probability
differs in situations with different levels of ambiguity.
Consistent with Baillon, Bleichrodt, Keskin, L’Haridon & Li (2013), we
observe that with more information (e.g., more experience with the car race
game, in our case), the probability weighting function becomes somewhat
steeper over time, meaning that subjective probabilities at very low and
very high levels become (marginally) closer to objective ones. This would
be called in the literature a reduction in ‘likelihood insensitivity’ as expe-
rience increases. Research conducted in other, more static settings usually
finds more likelihood insensitivity overall2 in cases of uncertainty than in
cases of risk (for a list of studies, see Baillon et al. 2013). Our experi-
mental setting is uncertain, not rich in feedback, and initially unfamiliar to
participants—which are also core features of many real situations in which
people form judgements about the outcomes of uncertain events (Haltiwanger
& Waldman 1985). In the lab setting, we can directly control participants’
previous experience, while observing what happens to judgement, decisions,
and perceived ambiguity as that experience increases.3 We find that despite
the significant complexity and dynamism of the scenario and the absence of
direct information about actual probabilities, a model of S-shaped probabil-
ity weighting fits the data remarkably well.
2 Experimental approach
To assess expectation formation during the unfolding of an uncertain event
whose outcome matters, we use a novel experimental design featuring mon-
etary payoffs whose scientific justification and relevant features are outlined
here. Further details are available in the Appendix and upon request from
the authors.
2For a formal definition and discussion of likelihood insensitivity (the nominal cause of
the inverse-S shaped relation between objective and subjective probabilities), see Wakker
(2010), chapter 7.
3Uncertainty due to imperfect foresight and humans’ inability to solve complex prob-
lems has been at the core of revisions to the use of optimization strategies in understand-
ing human actions (Alchian 1950). In fact, our setting in which betting on a simulated
car race is the core choice is redolent of the original discussions about subjective prob-
ability that emerged many decades ago, where the analogy to (horse) races was drawn
(de Finetti 1931, Anscombe & Aumann 1963, Heilig 1978).
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2.1 Justification
Our setting is intentionally built to mimic a real-life situation, such as
gambling or stock trading, in which the agent may observe initial infor-
mation about statistical likelihoods or even provide input into the out-
come generation process, but cannot perfectly anticipate a shock compo-
nent present in the process before the outcome occurs. We empirically
estimate the parameters of several non-expected utility models using our
laboratory-generated data, as has been done in previous studies of similar
real-life situations, with early research frequently using data from betting
markets to explore the subjective and estimated objective winning proba-
bilities (Griffith 1949, McGlothlin 1956, Weitzman 1965, Ali 1977) in, for
example, horse races (see, e.g., Ali 1977, Jullien & Salanié 2000).
A disadvantage of most real markets is that there is no unambiguous
‘true probability’ to which behavior can be related, as the statistician only
has access to realized events and not to the underlying true probabilities of
these events. The results and limitations of earlier studies thus suggest the
use of lab-based, real-life-mimicking experimental designs which have the
advantages of conferring control over the risky data generating process (and
hence allowing the researcher access to the objective probabilities); offering
a richer set of variables capturing individual characteristics; and ensuring
the absence of other potentially confounding factors, such as the presence of
bankruptcy laws.
2.2 Design
In our experiment, participants were confronted with six animated race car
games, where each participant’s final payoff was linked to the outcome of
one particular car.4 In each game, the participant chose how to divide a
fixed amount of money—earned previously in a real-effort task involving the
completion of as many cross-sum calculations as possible in ten minutes (see
Appendix A.3 for details)—into a wagered amount and an invested amount,
where greater investment increased the chances that the participant’s car
would win (see Figure A.1 in the Appendix). Each race lasted for 10 laps
and involved five cars in total (see Figure A.2), each performing according
to a statistical process comprised of a random-walk component and an ex-
ogenous downward shifter, explained to participants as a temporary engine
4Each participant faced his own game involving competing cars controlled by the com-
puter, with no interactions between the races or with the games of other participants. The
experiment was programmed in an early version of CORAL (Schaffner 2013).
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failure. The frequency of the incidence of this exogenous downward shock
was reduced for the participant’s car in proportion to the amount invested,
explained to participants as investment into engine quality. Our choice to
force participants either to bet or to invest their endowment was driven by
two motivations. First, we wished to prevent participants from being able
to merely hoard their endowment and thereby disengage monetarily (and
arguably emotionally) from the outcome of the uncertain scenario. Second,
we wished to increase the present salience of the opportunity cost of betting,
such that participants would make a well-considered decision. Our choice
to allow the initial endowment to vary depending on participants’ effort was
also intended to increase engagement.
Participants were offered the choice to withdraw from their bet at each of
three pit stops (after laps 3, 6, and 9; see Figure A.2). If they elected to drop
out at one of these points, then they would retain a fraction of the amount
originally wagered. This fraction, respectively at each successive pit stop,
was 40%, 25%, or 10% of the amount originally wagered. Upon a decision to
drop out, the participant would see the race continue to completion on the
screen, but would no longer have a monetary stake in its outcome. Partici-
pants’ expectations about the likelihood of their car winning were elicited at
the beginning of the race, and also at each of the three pit stops, by asking
them how many times out of 1,000 they thought their car would win if the
race were to continue 1,000 times from that point. The outcome of one of
the six races, chosen randomly, was paid out in cash at the conclusion of the
experiment.
To obtain data across different risk and endowment levels, we imple-
mented four distinct treatments, each of which affected the way in which
payoffs were structured. In the baseline treatment, participants received a
$5 show-up fee plus five times the amount wagered in the event that their
car won the race that was selected for payout. In the ‘wealth’ treatment, the
payoffs from the races stayed the same, but the show-up fee was increased
to $20. In the ‘high-stakes’ treatment, the show-up fee was again $5 but
participants won 15 times the amount wagered if their car won the race that
was selected for payout. Finally, in the ‘low-stakes’ treatment, participants
received twice the bet if their car won, the exact amount wagered if their car
came second, and half the wagered amount if their car came third.
In addition to gathering information about expectations and risk-taking
in the race stage of the experiment, we asked participants to respond to sev-
eral batteries of questions on their psychology and beliefs, and also collected
standard demographic information. After the experiment had concluded, we
used computerized repetitions of the data-generating process to simulate the
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actual likelihood for each race of the participant’s car winning the race from
the point of each pit stop, providing an objective picture of the future out-
come against which we could compare participants’ subjective expectations.
In our context, as in many real-life scenarios, the true (mathematical) prob-
ability of winning changed as the race went on, because of changes in the
observed positions of the cars. We therefore expected that subjective prob-
abilities too would adjust as this new information became available, and the
revelation of whether or not the participant’s car would win grew ever closer.
At the start of the race, we informed each participant of the overall odds
of his car winning the race, conditional on his choice of how much of his
endowment to invest, and how much to wager. Crucial to our experiment
however, and unlike the literature we build on, we did not tell participants
the true (updated) mathematical expectation of winning when they arrived
at the pit stops. We asked participants for their subjective probabilities
sequentially as this complex situation unfolded, rather than backing them
out of lottery choices at a point in time. Finally, every time we elicited a
subjective probability, we also recorded the subject’s degree of confidence in
that answer, yielding a measure of perceived ambiguity that we discuss in
greater detail later.
3 Simple statistics and model fit
A total of 239 participants took part in eight experimental sessions, all re-
cruited using using ORSEE (Greiner 2004) via standard emails from the
experimental participant pool at the ASBLab at the Australian School of
Business within the University of New South Wales. The average participant
age was 22 years, and 45.15% of participants were female. The large major-
ity of participants are enrolled in commerce (including also economics and
finance), engineering, and science. Only 6 percent of the participants are arts
major which may indicate that there is substantial homogeneity in regard
to familiarity with statistics. The average earnings in the real effort task,
which as described above could then be split into a wagered and an invested
amount, was $24.42. The average bet was $7.23, and there was a steep win-
ning curve: payoffs were highly volatile, ranging from $5 to $105.20, with an
average of $23.62 across all four treatments. Full sample sizes by treatment,
calculated at the levels of participant, participant-by-race, and participant-
by-pit-stop are given in Table 1. In ensuing regression tables, these sample
sizes fluctuate somewhat because of incomplete participant data on certain
explanatory variables.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Participants Participant-Races Participant-Pitstops
Sample sizes:
Baseline Treatment 58 348 1044
Wealth Treatment 59 354 1062
High-Stakes Treatment 61 365a 1095
Low-Stakes Treatment 61 366 1098
TOTAL 239 1433 4299
Complete demographicsb 233 1398 4194
Valid pitstopsc - - 3925
Key variables:
Pitstop expectations of winning 5.21 5.21 5.21
(standardized: times out of 10) (.15) (.08) (.05)
Simulated chances of winning 4.33 4.33 4.33
(standardized: times out of 10) (.13) (.08) (.05)
Ever dropped out of bet? 50.63% 18.49% 14.63%
Note: The top section of this table shows sample sizes, and the bottom section shows means of
the key analysis variables, at each level of analysis. Expectations of winning, simulated chances
of winning, and dropout behavior are all measured at the participant-pit-stop level. The bottom
section of the table also shows the standard error of each mean.
a One participant experienced a computer problem during the final race. The observation has
been excluded from the analysis, resulting in the total number of races of 365 for this treatment
instead of 366.
b Six participants had missing or obviously wrong information in their demographics and were
excluded from the respective analysis.
c Valid pitstops exclude all observations where participants had dropped out prior to the respective
pitstop.
The key phenomenon to take from this descriptive table is the presence
of aggregate over-optimism: participants report a belief that their car will
win in 521 out of 1000 continuations, whereas the true number, found via
our large-sample simulations, is 433 out of 1000. Subjective probabilities are
thus around 9 percentage points higher than objective ones on average, and
this difference is statistically significant, as can be seen from the small size
of the associated standard errors.
Next, we look at the evolution of the raw relationship between the sub-
jective probability and the objective probability of winning for each of the
6 races individuals faced, with a special focus on whether or not the match
between subjective and objective probabilities improves as individuals learn
more about the race. In the kernel plots shown in Figure 1, we see that for
all six races a very similar inverse S-shaped curve emerges, and casual visual
inspection does not indicate an obvious improvement in the fit as we move
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from Race 1 to Race 6. Still, the fitted regression slope is significantly steeper
for the later races (4-6) than for the earlier ones (1-3). A particular feature
evident in the plots for each race is that the subjective probability does not
clearly converge to 1 even when the objective probability is very close to
1. Also, subjective probability remains above the objective probability until
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Figure 1: Kernel Plots by Race
3.1 Is there information in stated probabilities?
As discussed above, participants were given the choice at each pit stop to ei-
ther withdraw from the race and receive a certain percentage of the bet, or let
the game proceed further. The inclusion of this behavioral choice, presented
at the same time that we elicit subjective probabilities, enables us to answer
the preliminary question of whether stated probabilities contain information
about choice behavior. Because the decision of whether to drop out involves
the utility value of entertainment and excitement, we should expect choice
behavior to relate not solely to subjective probability, but also to individual
heterogeneity in entertainment value and a complicated option value of con-
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tinuing.5 Nevertheless, by examining whether subjective probabilities help
explain choices, we can determine whether they contain any choice-relevant
information over and above the effects of objective probabilities.
If we concentrate on the decision made at the last pit stop—when there
are no future pit stops to anticipate—we can run more detailed specifications
without being worried about the complication of the option value of future
dropout opportunities. The optimal strategy in this situation, for a risk-
neutral individual in any treatment except ‘low stakes’ who is interested only
in monetary reward, is to drop out of the race if the probability of winning
is below 10f where f denotes the factor by which the wagered amount is
multiplied if the participant’s car wins (5 or 15 times, depending on the
treatment) and the numerator captures the 10% fraction of the wagered
amount that is paid out when dropping out at the final pit stop.
Table 2: Random Effects Probit coefficient estimates from the prediction of
dropping out of a race
All pitstops Final pitstop
Objective prob. -3.197*** -3.176*** -3.975***
(0.442) (1.002) (1.187)
Subjective prob. -2.161*** -2.576*** -3.881***
(0.350) (0.958) (1.158)
Obj. cutoff 1.625*** 1.704***
(0.243) (0.252)
Subj. cutoff 0.750** 1.312***
(0.316) (0.322)
Chi2 114.764 11.610 11.206 11.230 47.852 45.727 16.582
Pr() > Chi2 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 3935 907 907 907 907 907 907
ll -602.080 -120.133 -132.618 -135.097 -130.710 -133.266 -168.004
Significance levels: * 0.1; ** 0.05; *** 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the participant level in
parentheses.
N = 3935 includes all valid pit stops for the entire sample with 265 (6.73%) observation where
participants choose to drop out. N = 907 are all valid decisions at the third pit stop excluding the
Low-Stakes treatment for a different payoff structure and with 45 (4.96%) choosing to drop out.
The first two columns of Table 2, where objective and subjective stated
probabilities are used to predict dropout behavior either at all the pit stops
(Column 1) or only at the final pit stop (Column 2), clearly illustrate that
both real and stated probabilities affect the choice of whether to drop out.
Compared to specifications with only one of the two types of probabilities
included (shown in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2), the specification that in-
cludes both has a superior fit to the data in terms of the standard information
criteria (Bayesian, Aikake, and average likelihood (−log(ll)N )).
5For the first two of three pit stops, the option of continuing includes the possibility of
dropping out later.
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Columns 5 to 7 then show the estimated effect on dropout behavior of
the real or stated probability lying below the 10% cutoff described above.
Comparing these results to the results in prior columns of Table 2 reveals
that the contribution of subjective probabilities in explaining behavior is
not fully captured in the cutoffs alone: the log likelihood associated with
the model using only the cutoff dummies is substantially lower than that
associated with the model that includes the continuous probabilities. This
finding emphasizes that individuals do not make their choices purely on the
basis of maximizing expected monetary returns.
In the first two columns of Table 2, where we include both the actual
and stated probabilities, we find that the objective probability’s estimated
coefficient when predicting the latent variable related to the decision to drop
out is 50% to 100% higher than that of the subjective probability, and both
variables are highly significant in the equation. This intriguing finding indi-
cates that participants use information reflected in the real probability that
is not included in their stated probability.6 In addition, the fact that there is
additional cross-sectional variation in subjective probabilities that helps to
explain behavior above and beyond the variability in objective probabilities
supports the behavioral relevance and validity of our subjective probability
measures.
3.2 Ambiguity
A more subtle dimension of expectations about the future in a setting like
ours concerns an individual’s perceived uncertainty, or the ambiguity of his
belief, about the chances to win (see Manski 2004, Manski 2018, Giustinelli &
Pavoni 2017). Ambiguity may be understood generally as the degree to which
an individual believes he has the correct mental model of the phenomenon
in question. We measure ambiguity at each pit stop, directly following the
elicitiation of subjective probabilities, by asking participants the following
question: "How confident are you that your guess is roughly right? (out of
100%)". This offers us a measure of the ambiguity level perceived by each
participant in each decision-making situation.
The average level of ambiguity in our sample as measured this way is 0.29,
with individual measures ranging across the full scale of 0 to 1 (1=highest
ambiguity level, meaning zero confidence). Ambiguity is related to objective
6We do not explore this finding further here because there are many candidate expla-
nations for it that fall outside our focus in this paper, including subliminal excitement due
to unconscious awareness of additional information, and/or non-linearities in the decision
making process.
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and subjective probabilities, as shown in Figure 2, a heat map of the mean
ambiguity levels for each 0.025x0.025 grid over the subjective and objective
probability plane. Darker shades indicate higher average ambiguity levels.7
Ambiguity levels tend to be high (low) for low (high) subjective probability
values across the entire range of objective probability levels except for very
low objective probabilities (lower than 15%). It is strikingly not the case
that individuals who report low ambiguity also report subjective probabil-
ities well-matched to objective ones, which would be indicated by lighter
shading around the 45-degree line than elsewhere. Instead of this pattern,
Figure 2 shows a cluster of low-ambiguity observations with objective prob-
abilities near 1 but subjective probabilities around 0.2, indicating subjective
beliefs far from reality and yet held with high confidence. Similarly, very
low levels of ambiguity are present when subjective probabilities close to 1
are reported, regardless of what the objective probabilities are. The main
stylised take-away from the heat map can be seen in its vertical patterns:
when individuals have little confidence in their ability to read a situation,








































Figure 2: Mean Ambiguity across the Subjective and Objective Probability
Plane
Figure 3 reports OLS estimates predicting our measure of ambiguity for
7Grids with no data points were interpolated using the thin-plate-spine method (Press,
Teukolsky, Vetterline & Flannery 2007).
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all six races using pit stop dummies, with pit stop 1 the reference group.
Results indicate that belief ambiguity appears to decrease with time, evolv-
ing intuitively as the focal event draws closer, indicating some learning or
adjustments of mental models throughout a race. Yet, even in the last pit
stop of the last race, the level of ambiguity is still over 70% of that at the
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Race
Pit stop 1 Pit stop 2 Pit stop 3
Figure 3: Ambiguity across pit stops
4 Reduced form and structural analysis
4.1 Reduced form
The conditional mean E[ps|p,X] of subjective probability is informative in
its own right, in that under perfect rationality E[ps|p,X] = p, meaning that
deviations from this value throw light on the reduced-form divergence be-
tween stated beliefs and what the rationality assumption implies that beliefs
15
‘should’ be. In Table 3, we show these conditional means in the form of simple
OLS regressions exploring the relationship between subjective probabilities,
objective probabilities and ambiguity, with increasing arrays of characteris-
tics (X variables) controlled.8
The results in the first four columns of Table 3 show that the coefficient
on p in the regression predicting ps hovers around 0.4 to 0.5, with a standard
deviation of 0.02 to 0.03, implying that the coefficient is very significantly
smaller than 1.9 This finding is consistent with a systematic deviation from
rationality as described above. It suggests that on balance, the net behavioral
effect of increasing an event’s probability when that probability lies in the
middle range—analogous to a real world situation involving the odds of one
of two major political parties winning the next election—will be much smaller
than proportional to the actual change.
We do not measure the many mental models that individuals use to
conceptualize and interpret the situation they confront in this experiment.
However, we do conjecture that the more a person feels he has honed in
on a particular mental model to think about the choice situation, the more
likely that that model is useful in generating accurate subjective probabili-
ties, i.e., more “correct”. Consistent with this intuition, we observe that the
relation between subjective and actual probability is moderated by the level
of perceived ambiguity: the interaction between objective probability and
ambiguity estimated in Table 3 indicates that subjective probabilities will
track objective ones more strongly in settings that feature lower ambiguity.
The goal of adding sequentially more control variables to the specifica-
tions in Table 3 is to explore how much variation in subjective probabilities
can be explained using observable factors. The variables included are almost
surely endogenous to the processes that influence the formation of subjective
probability—which is why we include them as proxies for these processes—
but not to how objective probability is formed. We interpret the estimated
effects of our individual control variables on subjective probability as cap-
turing mainly the estimated influence of individual optimism, measured in
different ways. Controlling for an array of potential sources of individual
8As detailed in Appendix B, our Introductory and Follow-up Questionnaires collected a
vast array of information about participants. We selected the particular control variables
to include in the models shown in Table 3 and Table 6 based on a combination of goodness-
of-fit and coverage of the dimensions of the questionnaire (detailed estimation results for
the controls are provided in Appendix C).
9Adding additional power terms of the objective probability to capture the non-linear
relationship between it and subjective probability improves the model fit only marginally,
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































optimism is of particular interest in our context because optimism (about a
best outcome) or pessimism (about a worst outcome) influences risk-related
behavior (Abdellaoui, L’Haridon & Zank 2010), perhaps via the mechanism
of subjective probability formation. Our findings are generally in line with
earlier research findings indicating that wealthier and healthier respondents
tend to show more optimism in their stated probabilities. We find higher
stated probabilities among participants who are younger, have higher weekly
incomes, and/or are nonsmokers or vegetarians (see Appendix C for full es-
timation results).
In weighing alternatives to the assumption of rationality stated above,
it is interesting to know not merely the conditional mean E[ps|p,X], but
also the standard deviation of [ps−E[ps|p,X], which can serve as a measure
of how tightly the subjective probabilities are grouped around their condi-
tional mean. The smaller the standard deviation, the more ‘regular’ the
production of subjective probability. With this in mind, we estimate next
a slightly expanded reduced-form model that allows for both heteroskedas-
ticity and mean-level shifters. The main result of this heteroskedasticity
analysis, shown in the final two columns of Table 3, is that the effect of race
number (1 through 6) on the standard deviation has a coefficient of 0.002
(sd = 0.001), meaning that the standard deviation of the error term in the
subjective probabilities does not fall between race 1 and 6. This indicates an
absence of learning, which if present should produce a fall in the error over
time as participants become more familiar with the race game. Indeed, the
point estimate of the effect of race number is positive, not negative, although
it is insignificant at all conventional levels. On the other hand, the coefficient
of race number on the mean subjectivity probability is -0.013 (sd = 0.002)
and significant at the 1 percent level, meaning that the average stated prob-
ability falls over time, drawing closer to the average true probability. Hence,
while increasing experience with the game produces no learning in terms of
a lowered spread of subjective probabilities, the mean prediction error does
reduce.
4.2 Initial structural analysis
Although examining subjective probabilities in the above reduced-form man-
ner is useful in drawing comparisons with what the rationality paradigm im-
plies, the modelling exercises above cannot illuminate the deep structure of
subjective probability formation. In this section, we consider in more tech-
nical detail the process by which objective probabilities are transformed into
subjective ones. To identify which structure of subjective probability forma-
18
tion fits our data best, we horse-race four different theoretically-grounded
subjective probability functions that have been proposed in the literature by
fitting them to our data, using a simple maximum likelihood approach. We
first seek the model that best explains our subjective probability data, and
then proceed to estimate the determinants of the deep parameters of that
best-fitting model.




where γ < 1 and j enumerates all possible outcomes an individual might con-
sider. This function’s most salient characteristic is that small probabilities
are over-weighted and large probabilities are under-weighted, particularly
if there is a large number of possible outcomes. The first two models we
sequentially fit to our data are variations on this theme.
Our first model uses the set-up employed in Lattimore, Baker & Witte
(1992) and Gonzalez & Wu (1999):
psit =
αpγit
αpγit + (1− pit)γ
+ vit (1)
Model (1), widely discussed in the literature, is a log-odds linear representa-
tion of the relation between pit and psit. Here, the parameter γ < 1 measures
the change in sensitivity of the subjective probability to changes in the ob-
jective probability as the latter increases (i.e., γ controls curvature). α is
primarily responsible for the curve’s elevation, and measures the relative
level of optimism (Bruhin, Fehr-Duda & Epper 2010). The weighting func-
tion becomes more elevated as α increases and more curved as γ decreases
(Trepel et al. 2005). The error term vit is standard normally distributed
throughout, with unknown variance σ.
Our second model is taken from Wu & Gonzalez (1996):
psit =
pγit
[pγit + (1− pit)γ ]α
+ vit (2)
Model (2) is a reduction of the Lattimore et al. (1992) model in the event
that, in the prior model, α = 1. Similar to the work by Camerer & Ho
(1994) and Tversky & Kahneman (1992), Wu & Gonzalez (1996) estimate
only one parameter of Model (2) (γ, with α = 1/γ) instead of two. In a
later article (Gonzalez & Wu 1999), the authors argue that curvature and
elevation are two independent aspects of the function of interest and can
be captured separately using two parameters, rather than represented by a
single parameter as in Model (2).
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The third model is Prelec’s (1998) compound invariant model of psit based
on a particular axiomatic representation of choices between lotteries:10
psit = γ exp [−β(− ln pit)α] + vit (3)
Model (3) allows for much flatter inverse S-shapes, and breaks away from
the assumption that when pit approaches 1, perceived and real probabilities
must be the same (note in this function that when pit ↓ 0 then psit = 0, but
when pit = 1, psit = γ). As de Palma et al. (2008) point out, the parameter β
reflects pessimism, whereas α reflects the degree to which the inverse S-shape
is pronounced (p. 278).
The fourth model we estimate is Prelec’s (1998) conditional invariant
model of psit:
11
psit = γ exp [−
β
η
(1− pηit)] + vit (4)
Although the overall properties of Model (4) are similar to those of the
compound invariant model near the extremities of the distribution, Model
(4) allows for a slightly different shape. According to Prelec (2000), Models
(3) and (4) offer two distinct advantages: they rationalize different classes of
expected utility violations simultaneously, and they are tractable.
The results of sequentially fitting these models to our data are shown in
Table 4, where models and parameters are identified by the model number
and a shorthand abbreviation based on the names of the authors who pro-
posed the model and—for the Prelec models—the model type. For Model
(1) (the Lattimore et al. (1992) model), the log likelihood is -317.489 and
the estimates for α and γ are both significantly different from 1, implying a
strong aggregate inverse S-shape that deviates from rationality. For Model
(2) (the Wu & Gonzalez (1996) model), although the fit is slightly superior to
that of Model (1) (with a log likelihood of -314.372), the structural results
are somewhat similar: the estimate for γ is 0.23 and significantly smaller
than 1. Rationality is also violated in both the compound invariant and
conditional invariant models (Prelec 1998), with all coefficient estimates sig-
nificantly below 1, and with the stated probability in Model (4) only about
10The key preference axiom related to the compound invariant model is that, using
(xk, qk) to denote a lottery in which the actual outcome xk eventuates with probability
qk, it must hold that if (x1, q1)∼(x2, q2) and (x1, q3)∼(x2, q4) then (x3, (q1)M )∼(x4, (q2)M )
implies (x3, (q3)M )∼(x4, (q4)M ) with M≥1.
11The key axiom related to the conditional invariant model is that, with 0 < λ < 1,
it would have to hold that if (x1, q1) ∼ (x2, q2) and (x1, q3) ∼ (x2, q4), then (x3, λq1) ∼
(x4, λq2) implies (x3, λq3) ∼ (x4, λq4).
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three-quarters (γ = 0.74) of the real probability when the real probability is
at the limit of 1. The log likelihoods of Models (3) and (4) are -263.393 and
-254.887, respectively, giving an early indication that Model (4) is superior.
Table 4: ML estimation of the functional form of subjective probabilities
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
[LBW] [WG] [Pcomp] [Pcond]
σ(vit) 0.261 0.261 0.258 0.257





















N 4194 4194 4194 4194
ll -317.489 -314.372 -263.393 -254.887
AIC 640.98 634.74 534.79 517.77
BIC 660.00 653.77 560.15 543.14
Standard errors in parentheses. σ(vit) denotes the estimated variance of the
errors in the given model.
We next statistically compare the results for each model using the three
most commonly used criteria: Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), the
Bayesian information criterion (BIC), and the average log likelihood. We run
these comparisons overall, and then after disaggregating the data into ‘low’
(below-median) and ‘high’ (above-median) ambiguity cases. We also present
results excluding observations at the middle and endpoint of ambiguity—
corresponding to reports of being 0%, 50%, or 100% confident that one’s
guess is roughly right—as the expectation literature has shown that respon-
dents tend to use only a subset of focal values in a 0-100 scale, such as
0, 50, and 100 (for a discussion, see Bruine de Bruin, Fischbeck, Stiber &
Fischhoff 2002, de Bruin, Fischhoff, Millstein & Halpern-Felsher 2000, Fis-
chhoff & De Bruin 1999, Hill, Perry & Willis 2004, Hudomiet & Willis 2013,
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Table 5: Likelihood comparisons across the four structural models
LBW (1992) WG (1996) Prelec (1998) Prelec (1998)
Comp. Inv. Cond. Inv.
AIC 640.98 634.74 534.79 517.77
BIC 660.00 653.77 560.15 543.14
−ln(L)/N 0.0757 0.0750 0.0628 0.0608
Without mid-
and endpoints
AIC 490.70 484.68 341.29 299.54
BIC 509.23 503.21 366.00 324.24
−ln(L)/N 0.0682 0.0673 0.0469 0.0410
Low Ambiguity
AIC 311.58 292.16 276.21 213.24
BIC 328.61 309.19 298.91 235.95
−ln(L)/N 0.0708 0.0663 0.0622 0.0476
High Ambiguity
AIC -318.14 -317.30 -469.32 -470.27
BIC -301.28 -300.45 -446.85 -447.80
−ln(L)/N -0.0796 -0.0794 -0.1172 -0.1174
AIC=2*k-2*ln(L); BIC=-2*ln(L)+k*ln(N). L=likelihood, N=number of observations,
and k=number of estimated parameters.
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Kleinjans & Soest 2014).12 Table 5 shows that Prelec’s (1998) conditional
invariant model gives a superior fit by a large margin for the data overall and
in two of the remaining three cases; for the data from the high-ambiguity
setting used in the final rows of Table 5, the two Prelec models are clearly
superior to the other two models, but have fit statistics that appear very
similar to one another. Under particular conditions, the AIC is chi-square
distributed, making the differences between models very significant not only
in terms of sheer likelihood ratios, but also at the conventional 1% and even
0.01% levels of statistical significance.13
4.3 Extended structural analysis
Because Prelec’s (1998) conditional invariant model delivers the best over-
all fit, we now parameterize its main components: σ, which captures the
heteroskedasticity of the error term; γ, which can be interpreted as the sub-
jective probability corresponding to objective certainty; and β, which cor-
responds to the sensitivity of the subjective probability to low values of p
(i.e.,the higher is β, the steeper is the slope of ps for low values of p, and
the higher the value of p at which the subjective and objective probabilities
cross). We perform this exercise based on the following extended structural
model, where the δ’s can be interpreted either as capturing the aggregate
level of the associated deep structural parameter, or simply as best-fit co-
efficients capturing the influence on deep parameters of several variables at
once: 14
12We also plotted the relation between objective and subjective probabilities that we
recover when fitting the four models to our data overall, and to the data subsets described
here; see Figure C.1 in Appendix C.
13Since the models are non-nested and have different basic structures, there is no theo-
retically clear way to parameterize all four of them and then compare results. Indeed, for
all these models, full parameterization engenders convergence issues because of the high
degree of collinearity and the associated problems of a flat likelihood. Nevertheless, if
we limit ourselves to structurally recovering only two parameters from the data for each
model (including the variance of the error term), Prelec’s (1998) conditional invariant
model consistently delivers the best fit across all selections of parameter pairs (using the
same variables from the data).
14We tried modelling all parameters of this model as functions of our data, but the
collinearity in the parameters is too great to allow for this, meaning there is not enough
variation in the data—rich as it is—to tease apart the determinants of all of the parameters
separately.
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ps = γ exp [−β
η
(1− pη)] + v
γ = xitδ0
v ∼ N(0, σ2) = N(0, (p, xitδ1))
β = xitδ2
To ensure γ, β, and σ are within their theoretical bounds, i.e., 0 <
γ ≤ 1, β > 0 and σ > 0 (η is unconstrained), in the maximum likelihood
model, we estimate ρ, ψ, and φ as free parameters such that γ is the inverse
logit transformation of ρ, and β, and σ is the exponential form of ψ, and
φ, respectively. The results of estimating the parameters of this extended
structural model using our data are given in Table 6.
Table 6: Structural ML estimates of probability function parameters
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(σ)
Objectiv prob. -0.144*** (0.032) -0.124*** (0.040) -0.260*** (0.042) -0.251*** (0.044)
Pitstop -0.017 (0.013) -0.008 (0.014) -0.002 (0.014) 0.002 (0.014)
Race Number (1-6) 0.019*** (0.006) 0.019*** (0.007) 0.019*** (0.007) 0.025*** (0.007)
Amount wagered -0.016*** (0.004) -0.015*** (0.004) -0.022*** (0.005)
Real-Effort Earnings -0.006*** (0.002) -0.006** (0.002) -0.013*** (0.003)
Amount to be won 0.002*** (0.000) 0.000 (0.001) 0.002*** (0.001)
High Treatment -0.075* (0.041) -0.040 (0.051) -0.060 (0.055)
Low Treatment -0.014 (0.036) -0.004 (0.040) 0.223*** (0.045)
Wealth Treatment -0.005 (0.034) -0.031 (0.039) -0.067 (0.045)
Guess the winner 0.035** (0.014) -0.000 (0.017) 0.052*** (0.020)
Experiment experience 0.128*** (0.032) 0.122*** (0.036) 0.070* (0.037)
constant -1.335*** (0.039) -1.296*** (0.072) -1.201*** (0.285) -1.068*** (0.359)
ln(β)
Pitstop 0.071* (0.041) 0.052 (0.037) 0.070** (0.032) 0.010 (0.030)
Race Number (1-6) 0.060*** (0.017) 0.058*** (0.015) 0.061*** (0.014) 0.071*** (0.011)
Amount wagered 0.035*** (0.007) 0.049*** (0.007) 0.026*** (0.008)
Real-Effort Earnings 0.027*** (0.005) 0.016*** (0.005) 0.006 (0.005)
Amount to be won -0.002* (0.001) -0.002*** (0.001) -0.001* (0.001)
High Treatment -0.011 (0.133) 0.411*** (0.115) 0.699*** (0.091)
Low Treatment 0.067 (0.078) 0.177** (0.074) 0.662*** (0.079)
Wealth Treatment 0.103 (0.073) 0.338*** (0.079) 0.666*** (0.074)
Guess the winner 0.211*** (0.037) 0.155*** (0.041) 0.111*** (0.033)
Experiment experience 0.037 (0.070) -0.079 (0.069) -0.012 (0.065)
constant -1.499*** (0.121) -2.421*** (0.182) -4.120*** (0.531) -5.242*** (0.658)
logit(γ)
Pitstop 0.215*** (0.040) 0.197*** (0.040) 0.186*** (0.038) 0.003 (0.035)
Race Number (1-6) -0.010 (0.019) 0.006 (0.019) -0.002 (0.019) -0.033* (0.018)
Amount wagered 0.091*** (0.019) 0.046** (0.019) -0.171*** (0.037)
Real-Effort Earnings -0.001 (0.006) -0.012* (0.007) 0.017 (0.012)
Amount to be won -0.001 (0.003) 0.006** (0.003) 0.024*** (0.007)
High Treatment 0.038 (0.125) -0.058 (0.149) 0.432* (0.233)
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Low Treatment -0.363*** (0.111) 0.176 (0.126) 2.199*** (0.344)
Wealth Treatment -0.210** (0.102) 0.054 (0.108) 0.795*** (0.145)
Guess the winner 0.002 (0.046) -0.251*** (0.056) -0.199** (0.078)
Experiment experience 0.101 (0.086) -0.213* (0.120) -1.193*** (0.170)
constant 0.629*** (0.110) 0.303 (0.195) 1.338 (1.130) -8.647*** (2.196)
η
constant 0.224*** (0.021) 0.259*** (0.030) 0.312*** (0.036) 0.407*** (0.070)
Demographic No No Yes Yes
Psychological No No No Yes
Physiological No No No Yes
N 4194 4194 4194 4194
ll -215.895 -75.318 209.341 716.767
Significance levels: * 0.1; ** 0.05; *** 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. (I) denotes
indexes built from sets of variables. See Appendix for further details on all control vari-
ables.
One set of parameters of interest in Table 6 are the determinants of the
heteroskedasticity in subjective probabilities, as these relate to whether or
not the distribution of subjective probability becomes tighter as people ac-
quire more experience. In our richest specification, shown in Column 4 of
Table 6, the estimated coefficient on the race number (i.e., more experience
with the race car game) is 0.025. Far from being negative, this coefficient
implies an absence of learning across the six rounds of the experiment. The
variable capturing prior experience as an experimental participant is also pos-
itive in predicting the variance of subjective probabilities, which we again
take as evidence against learning effects. Higher race number is also esti-
mated to have a positive rather than negative effect on β, the deep parameter
for which a higher value indicates more curvature of subjective probabilities
in relation to objective probabilities. We take this as further evidence that
more experience with our race car game does not push our participants fur-
ther toward accurate predictions about the game’s outcome.
To gain more insight into the meaning of the large numbers of coefficients
displayed in Table 6, we next show the frequency distributions of the three
key parameters. Figure 4 shows the distribution of β̂ = xitδ̂2, Figure 5
the distribution of γ̂ = xitδ̂0, and Figure 6 the distribution of σ̂ =
√
xitδ̂1.
We create these displays based on the results of our richest specification, to
examine the range of possible values of each parameter. These frequency
distributions show that the range of parameters across participants is very
high.
Figure 4 shows us the wide range of values taken on by β̂. The mean
of the estimated β̂s is around 0.62, implying that β̂η̂ is close to 1.5 (since
η̂ = 0.41) which in turn implies that as p approaches zero, ps approaches
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Figure 4: Distribution of β̂ = xitδ̂2
the range of objective probabilities, when p approaches one, ps approaches
γ̂, which equals roughly 0.83 at the mean of the γ̂’s. Hence, for the mean
values of these coefficients, average subjective probability varies only between
0.185 and 0.83 as p varies over its entire range, from 0 to 1.
Similarly, looking at Figure 5, the distribution of γ̂ exhibits some mass
near γ̂ = 1, indicating that there is a substantial number of individuals for
whom ps approaches one as p approaches one.
Figure 6 shows that the distribution for σ̂ is somewhat erratic, with a
mean around 0.21 but some individuals above 0.3 and a few below 0.1, from
which we mainly deduce that almost no participants will have had a stable
answering strategy that fits with the hypothesized subjective probability
function.15
15One might object to this by noting that our use of an additive error term in the
presence of a bounded subjective probability term almost ‘forces’ a low mean γ̂. This
turns out not to be true: when one forces all observations to be fitted by only structural
coefficients, thereby forcing an inverse S-shape to fit each combination of subjective prob-
abilities with objective probabilities in the data, then given what is shown in Figure 1,
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Finally, we show in the left panel of Figure 7 what the implied subjec-
tive probability function looks like for different archetypal individuals: for
the average individual in the sample (for whom xit = x); for the individ-
ual with the highest estimated γ̂ given estimated β̂ is closest to 1 (whom
one might label the ‘most rational’); and for the individual with the highest
estimated σ̂ (whom one might label the ‘most erratic’). The person who
displays near-rational behavior exhibits an almost 1-to-1 correspondence be-
tween real probabilities and subjective probabilities, bar a slight non-linearity
near p = 0. The ‘most erratic’ person also displays almost the same subjec-
tive probability function as the ‘most rational’. The person with the average
values of observable characteristics displays a strong non-linearity very close
to p = 0 and then a flattening out until p = 1. In the right panel of Figure 7,
we graph the subjective probability function of the average individual from
the subset of data that excludes reports of 0%, 50%, or 100% ambiguity,
which is not noticeably different from the default shown in the left panel,16
and then of the average individual from the subset of data featuring low
ambiguity. The latter function lies above the former for the entire range of
p, indicating more over-optimism in settings that are less ambiguous.
a linear error term ‘merely’ forces the estimated γ̂ to reflect the average sample behavior
near p = 1 seen in Figure 1.
16Perhaps unsurprisingly, 80 percent of those participants who selected focal answers
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Figure 7: Graph of subjective versus objective probabilities under different
settings
5 Discussion
The experimental approach in our paper is motivated by the fact that in
most real-life choice situations, it is unrealistic to assume that individuals
have access to the true probability of a good outcome. Whether it concerns
corporate profits, movements in the price of goods, the arrival rate of po-
tential marriage partners, the health of children and family, or the advent
of a competitor, we have to guess the probabilities of good things eventu-
ating based on limited information and with no credible outside source of
truth. If even macroeconomists cannot accurately forecast inflation, and
health economists cannot say with certainty how much disease reduction
the extra dollar of health care buys, how can lesser-educated, ‘ordinary’
economic agents arrive at an estimate other than very imperfectly? Faced
with the complex uncertainty of real life, are individual guesses about the
probability of events remotely accurate and, if not, are they systematically
wrong? By designing a lab-based choice situation that is complicated and
cognitively taxing—but with the truth knowable to the researcher—we are
able to explore the link between objective and subjective probabilities in
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a setting where the complexity level and the agent’s access to information
mimic reality.
Subjective probabilities, when plotted against objective probabilities,
have been found by prior researchers to exhibit an inverse S-shape when
experimental participants are told the true probabilities and their subjective
probabilities are inferred from choices. We find that this inverse S-shape is
also exhibited in our setting. Of the four models of subjective probability
formation that we fit to our empirical data, Prelec’s (1998) compound in-
variant model fits bets. Intriguingly, we see no evidence of learning: both
the mean and the the variance of the error term (the deviation away from
the inverse S-curve) are non-decreasing with the number of previous races
experienced, both in reduced-form analysis and in structural modelling.
Examining the information about subjective probabilities in our data
leads us to four additional observations. First, a 50 percent actual probabil-
ity of a positive outcome (i.e., winning) was perceived by our participants
as a 70 percent chance of winning. This suggests that in very complicated
real-world situations, people make large over-estimates of middle-range prob-
abilities of positive events. Second, we find severe under-estimation on av-
erage of the probability of events that in actuality are near certain to occur,
with subjective probabilities no higher than 80% on average for events that
will transpire with close to 100% certainty. Third, we find a large degree of
individual heterogeneity in the relation between objective probabilities and
subjective ones, with the extremities in the sample including near-rationality
at the boundaries as well as extreme unresponsiveness to changes in actual
probabilities in a middle range (i.e., flat inverse S-shapes). Thus, we find lit-
tle evidence that ‘one shape fits all’. Fourth, choice situations featuring high
levels of perceived ambiguity tend to produce lower subjective probabilities
which are also less sensitive to increases in objective probabilities, suggesting
that ambiguity triggers a flight towards a particular default position, in this
case pessimism.
In aggregate, our results suggest that individual decision-making in the
presence of real-world complexity still conforms to the main tendencies ob-
served in typical probability experiments: specifically, small probabilities
are overestimated and large probabilities are underestimated. In terms of
broad policy implications, this finding implies that aggregate behavior will
not be proportionately reactive to changes in real probabilities in a middle
range, and will be over-reactive to changes at the extremes. Our results in
general, including our finding that ambiguity depresses response and encour-
ages pessimism, also presage great difficulty in convincing individuals of the
relevance of evidence-based projections and the legitimacy of optimism when
31
a situation is dynamic, new, and very complicated.
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A Screenshots and experimental procedures
All experimental treatment protocols (baseline, “wealth", “high-stakes" and
“low-stakes", as described in the text) consisted of six stages, as follows:
• An Introductory Questionnaire
• Relaxation, consisting of 5 minutes of relaxing beach sounds together
with a voice-over of visualization guidance in a calm female voice
• Real Effort, consisting of cross sum calculations (adding up as many
sets of 5-digit numbers as possible in a fixed time window), resulting
in earned income
• A Test Race, consisting of 3 laps with labelled screens and a guiding
voice-over in the same female voice used in the Relaxation stage
• 6 Real Races
• An incentivized “Guess the Winner" game
• A Follow-up Questionnaire focussing on demographics
Some participants wore heart rate monitors throughout the experiment,
and all participants wore headphones from the start of the Relaxation stage
until the end of the Real Races stage.
A.1 Introductory Questionnaire
In the Introductory Questionnaire, the participants were asked a set of stan-
dard questions regarding personality, locus of control, past/present/future
savouring, and risk attitudes. These questions are reproduced in the next
section.
A.2 Relaxation
The Relaxation stage was included to familiarize participants with a calm
voice that would guide them through the car race set-up, and also to establish
baseline readings for the heart rate monitors. Data from these monitors is
not used in the present paper.
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A.3 Real Effort
In the Real Effort stage, participants were presented with cross-sum problems
for 10 minutes. The problems gradually became more difficult, and the
participants receive a fixed amount per solved problem. A participant could
opt to drop out of the solving process, and receive compensation for time
foregone. Participants were able to earn up to 30 experimental dollars in
this way.
A.4 Test Race
In the Test Race stage, participants were guided through the race process,
with a voice-over explaining all the steps. Then a test race was shown, after
which the participants had to answer a set of questions in order to proceed.
The questions were explicitly designed so that they could not easily be solved
by trial and error, and asking the experiment administrators in case of any
question or confusion about the race procedure was explicitly encouraged.
A.5 Real Races
The Real Races stage confronted participants with 6 car races, in each of
which participants could decide on how much of their earned income they
would invest into their car and how much they would bet. Each race was
independent of the others and one race would be paid out randomly in the
end, so all of the earnings were available in each race. 17 The 6 cars would
then race, and the advancement of each car was governed by the AR(1)
process outlined in equation 5:
st = θsbase + (1− θ) ∗ (1 + U(−γ,+γ)) ∗ st−1 +Dt ∗ f (5)
where st is the advancement of the car between time t− 1 and time t (δt =
1/60second), and θ governs the importance of the base speed sbase = 50. θ
was set to 0.02, with the remaining weight of .08 placed upon the speed at
t− 1 multiplied by one plus a uniform random change in speed of ±γ = 0.1.
Finally, with probability β, Dt = 1 and a shock of f = −25 was applied (in
the other 1−β fraction of times, no shock was applied). This functional form
was selected in order to give the race a natural appearance while allowing
meaningful manipulation of the winning probability, through the raising or
lowering of β.
17Participants were not allowed to retain any of the earnings: the full amount had to
be split between investing and betting.
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Compared to no investment, full investment in the car would change the
rate of engine failures (β) from an expected 4 engine failures in 5 laps (the
‘no investment’ option, associated with almost zero % chance of winning)
to a certain zero failures (the ‘full investment’ option, associated with an
almost 100% chance of winning, but with no money left over to wager, and
hence nothing to win). The other 4 cars would always have an expected rate
of 2 engine failures in 5 rounds.
Figure A.1 shows the screen participants faced at the beginning of each
race. As shown, they could choose the division of the money they had earned
in the real-effort task into an amount bet on their car, and an amount in-
vested in their car’s engine. All the information about the possible outcomes
of the race, including the amounts to be recovered by dropping out at each of
the pit stops, was displayed and updated whenever the participant changed
his proposed decision using the slider. Each participant could also choose the
color of his car each race, which was of no consequence to the race outcome.
Figure A.2 shows the screen participants encountered at the first pit stop.
This screen offers a choice of whether or not to drop out of the race, and
shows the payoffs associated with dropping out and with not dropping out
and experiencing either of two states of the world: that in which one’s car
wins, and that in which one’s car does not win. The screens for the second
and third pit stop were nearly identical, with simply a later dropout choice
bolded.
At the pit stops, the key variable of participants’ subjective expectation
of winning was elicited by having the participant move a slider to answer the
question: “If the race were to continue from this point randomly 1000 times,
how often would your car come first?”
The “Amount wagered" analysis variable is simply the amount that the
participant chose to bet on his car, which is equal to “Real-effort Earnings"
minus the amount invested in the car’s engine. The “Amount to be won"
analysis variable is the maximum amount that could have been won in the
given race, once the participant placed a bet—that is, the amount that would
be won if the participant did not drop out of his initial bet and if, in addition,
his car won.
A.6 Guess the Winner
In the incentivized “Guess the winner" game, which was played 6 times,
participants were presented with a visual state of the race at a given pit
stop (3,6, or 9) and had to bet on how often out of 1000 races their car
would come first, conditional on the present position and race stage, by
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Figure A.1: Screenshot of the pre-race investment screen, with sliders for
choosing the bet amount and entering expectations about race outcome.
specifying a point estimate and an interval. Participants were able to select
an interval of between 2 and 200 times. The larger the interval they chose, the
lower was the amount they would win if their interval contained the correct
value. They amount they could win from this “Guess the winner" game was
displayed when they moved the interval slider. The race was then simulated
1000 times from the given point by the computer, and if the number of times
the participant’s car won fell into the prediction interval he had nominated,
then the participant would receive $ 0.10 plus $ x = ((200− interval)/200).
Participants’ winnings were summed up and paid out over the six “Guess
the winner" games, and this total amount won was also used as the “Guess
the winner" analysis variable, which is intended as an indicator of how well
participants were able to predict the outcome of a race.
A.7 Follow-up Questionnaire
The Follow-up Questionnaire included questions on a variety of demographic
characteristics. The variables on participant characteristics included in our
analysis are constructed from these questions and the questions posed in the
Introductory Questionnaire, which are provided in the next section.
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Figure A.2: Screenshot of the car race at the first pit stop, showing the




The following statements posed to participants in the Introductory Question-
naire were coupled with scaled answer alternatives, ranging from Strongly
Agree to Strongly Disagree. These items constitute a battery of self-esteem
questions based on Rosenberg (1965). After reverse-coding questions 1, 3,
4, 7, and 10, we take the simple average of responses across all ten of these
questions to construct our measure of self-esteem.
• On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.
• At times I think I am no good at all.
• I feel that I have a number of good qualities.
• I am able to do things as well as most people.
• I feel I do not have much to be proud of.
• I certainly feel useless at times.
• I feel that I am a person of worth, or at least on an equal plane with
others.
• I wish I could have more respect for myself.
• All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure.
• I take a positive attitude toward myself.
B.2 Optimism
The following questions, also answered on a Strongly Agree to Strongly Dis-
agree scale, were used to capture participants’ levels of optimism. The raw
answers to item 4 below were used to create the analysis variable ‘Disap-
pointment’, and those from item 6 were used to create the analysis variable
‘Low Expectations’.
1. When I’m in a new and unfamiliar situation, I am always optimistic
that things will work out for me (in other words, I feel and think that
things will be OK).18
18 This variable was excluded from the analysis due to insignificant results.
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2. I often find myself doing things that I know, at the time I choose to
do them, I will regret later.
3. When I expect that good things are going to happen to me in the
future, I feel better about myself.18
4. When I get disappointed about something, it makes me feel that I’m
to blame, because I should have known better in the first place and
not expected as much.
5. I always try to be cautious when I approach new and unfamiliar situ-
ations, in case something goes wrong.18
6. I prefer to have low expectations of the future since that way I might
be pleasantly surprised, and I’m protected from being disappointed.18
B.3 Locus of control
The following seven items, adapted from Rotter (1966) and answered on a
Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree scale, were used to measure locus of
control. Answers to these questions (after appropriate reverse-coding) were
averaged to obtain each participant’s measure of locus of control.
• I have little control over the things that happen to me.
• There is really no way I can solve some of the problems I have.
• There is little I can do to change many of the important things in my
life.
• I often feel helpless in dealing with the problems of life.
• Sometimes I feel that I’m being pushed around in life.
• What happens to me in the future mostly depends on me.
• I can do just about anything I really set my mind to.
B.4 Savoring
We also measured savoring, which we understand as individuals’ capacity to
enjoy good events in the past, present, and future, based on participants’
answers to a battery of questions adapted from Bryant & Veroff (2006). The
list of questions, each of which was answered on a Strongly agree to Strongly
Disagree scale, is as follows:
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1. Before a good thing happens, I look forward to it in ways that give me
pleasure in the present.
2. It’s hard for me to hang onto a good feeling for very long.
3. I enjoy looking back on happy times from my past.
4. I don’t like to look forward to good times too much before they happen.
5. I know how to make the most of a good time.
6. I don’t like to look back at good times too much after they’ve taken
place.
7. I feel a joy of anticipation when I think about upcoming good things.
8. When it comes to enjoying myself, I’m my own ‘worst enemy’.
9. I can make myself feel good by remembering pleasant events from my
past.
10. For me, anticipating what upcoming good events will be like is basically
a waste of time.
11. When something good happens, I can make my enjoyment of it last
longer by thinking or doing certain things.
12. When I reminisce about pleasant memories, I often start to feel sad or
disappointed.
13. I can enjoy pleasant events in my mind before they actually occur.
14. I can’t seem to capture the joy of happy moments.
15. I like to store memories of fun times that I go through so that I can
recall them later.
16. It’s hard for me to get very excited about fun times before they actually
take place.
17. I feel fully able to appreciate good things that happen to me.
18. I find that thinking about good times from the past is basically a waste
of time.
19. I can make myself feel good by imagining what a happy time that is
about to happen will be like.
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20. I don’t enjoy things as much as I should.
21. It’s easy for me to rekindle the joy from pleasant memories.
22. When I think about a pleasant event before it happens, I often start
to feel uneasy or uncomfortable.
23. It’s easy for me to enjoy myself when I want to.
24. For me, once a fun time is over and gone, it’s best not to think about
it.
After reverse-coding questions 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17, 19, 21, and
23, we take the average of responses to questions 1, 4, 7, 10, 13, 16, 19, and
22 to measure future-savoring (“SBI Anticipate" in the tables); the average
of responses to questions 2, 5, 8, 11, 14, 17, 20, and 23 to measure present-
savoring (“SBI Moment"); and the average of responses to questions 1, 6, 9,
12, 15, 18, 21, and 24 to measure past-savoring (“SBI Reminisce" ).
B.5 Non-incentivized risk aversion
To measure non-incentivized risk aversion, we used a standard (Holt & Laury
2002) lottery choice task in the Introductory Questionnaire, where the safe
choices were $20 and $16 and the risky choices were $40 and $1 (roughly 5
times the values in the original paper (Holt & Laury 2002)). The following
introductory text was used:
For each of the nine pairs of lotteries listed below, please select
your preferred lottery: either option A or option B. Each lottery
is characterised by the probability of receiving one of two payoffs.
(Probabilities are expressed as percentage chances of receiving
this payoff, e.g. 20% = a chance of 2 out of 10 of receiving this
payoff).
The participants then had to choose between the following options in
each line, where on the participant’s screen, the “–” was displayed as “chance
of”:
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10% – $ 20 and 90% – $ 16 A B 10% – $ 40 and 90% – $1
20% – $ 20 and 80% – $ 16 A B 20% – $ 40 and 80% – $1
30% – $ 20 and 70% – $ 16 A B 30% – $ 40 and 70% – $1
40% – $ 20 and 60% – $ 16 A B 40% – $ 40 and 60% – $1
50% – $ 20 and 50% – $ 16 A B 50% – $ 40 and 50% – $1
60% – $ 20 and 40% – $ 16 A B 60% – $ 40 and 40% – $1
70% – $ 20 and 30% – $ 16 A B 70% – $ 40 and 30% – $1
80% – $ 20 and 20% – $ 16 A B 80% – $ 40 and 20% – $1
90% – $ 20 and 10% – $ 16 A B 90% – $ 40 and 10% – $1
The number of safe choices (i.e., selections of option A) was used in the
analysis as an indicator of risk attitude, with the variable label “Risk aversion
(HL)", if participants exhibited a single switching point from A to B as
they proceeded from the top of the table to the bottom. Participants with
more than one switching point were classified as switching on the fifth line,
corresponding to slight risk aversion. Exclusion of these latter participants
did not alter the outcome.
B.6 Follow-up questionnaire
The following questions/statements were posed to participants in the Follow-
up Questionnaire. Some questions required participants to type in answers in
free-form; others were followed either by scaled answer alternatives, ranging
from Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree, or by appropriately populated
arrays of answer alternatives. The exact mapping of the answers to these
questions to variables used in our analysis is straightforward and available
upon request.
• What is your year of birth?
• What is your month and day of birth?19
• Please indicate your gender.
• Please enter your nationality.19
• Please enter the country you were born.19
• Please enter the country whose culture you identify with most strongly.
(This variable was used to create the Culture dummies in the regres-
sion, participants where put in three main categories, Australian, Asian
and Other which is predominately USA or European.)
19 This variable was excluded from the analysis due to insignificant results and/or
collinearity issues.
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• Do you speak English at home?
• Are you currently . . . (married, in a partnership, or single).19
• What is your current living situation?19
• Please enter the postcode of the area you live in.19
• Which degree program are you enrolled in (Economics; Commerce;
etc.)?19
• When do you expect to graduate (month, year)?19
• Are you an international student?
• Have you ever participated in an experiment before?
• What is your weekly disposable income?
(None or <$100, $100-$199, $200-$299, $300-$399, $400-$499, >$500
—This variable was encoded as “None”, “Low”, “Avg.”, and “High”,
where no participant reported an weekly income above $399)
• What was the highest year of school you completed?
• And how much schooling did your mother complete?
• And how much schooling did your father complete?
• Did you complete an educational qualification after leaving school?
Please include any trade certificates, apprenticeships, diplomas, de-
grees or other educational qualifications.
• If yes, what was the highest type of qualification you obtained?
• Did your mother complete an educational qualification after leaving
school? Please include any trade certificates, apprenticeships, diplo-
mas, degrees or other educational qualifications.
• If yes, what was the highest type of qualification she obtained?
• Did your father complete an educational qualification after leaving
school? Please include any trade certificates, apprenticeships, diplo-
mas, degrees or other educational qualifications.
• If yes, what was the highest type of qualification he obtained?
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• Please select the category or class of professions your mother’s occu-
pation falls into (even if she is unemployed).
• What is the full title of your mother’s occupation?
• Please select the category of class of professions your father’s occupa-
tion falls into (even if he is unemployed).
• What is the full title of your father’s occupation?
• Are you a vegetarian?
• How tall are you, in centimetres?
• How much do you weigh in light clothing, in kilograms?
• Do you regularly smoke any tobacco product, such as cigarettes, cigars,
or pipes?
• When you drink alcohol, on average, how many drinks do you have?
• Are you taking a prescribed medication?19
• Have you had any symptoms of or complaints about depression during
the last month (30 days)?
• Which hand do you write with?
• What is your opinion of the following statement: ‘Good luck charms
sometimes do bring good luck.’ (answer scale: Definitely not true,
Probably not true, Don’t know, Maybe, Probably true, Definitely
true)19
• Do you have a lucky charm?
• Many people think there is someone watching out for them to make
sure things go well. This someone cannot be directly seen. Is there
someone, who cannot be seen by others, watching over you?19
• Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, how often do you at-
tend religious services these days?19
• How satisfied are you with your financial situation?19
• In political matters, people talk of “the left" and “the right". How
would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?19
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• All things considered in your life, how happy would you say you are
usually?
• Would you say that your family is ... (wealthier (Wealth Level Above),
the same (Wealth Level Avg), or poorer (Wealth Level Poor) than
others)?
• Overall, how would you rate your performance at university?
• Betting is justified.
• Gambling is justified.19
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C Additional Results
Table C.1: OLS regression results from predicting stated (subjective) proba-
bility
(3) (4) Heteroskedasticity Model
Mean-shifter (β) Variance-shifter (σ)
Objectiv prob. 0.431*** (0.023) 0.570*** (0.033) 0.426*** (0.016) -0.236*** (0.012)
Pitstop -0.009** (0.004) -0.031*** (0.004) -0.014*** (0.003) 0.003 (0.002)
Race Number (1-6) -0.011*** (0.003) -0.011*** (0.003) -0.004** (0.002) -0.000 (0.001)
Amount wagered -0.011*** (0.003) -0.014*** (0.003) -0.005*** (0.001) 0.000 (0.001)
Real-Effort Earnings -0.002 (0.002) -0.000 (0.002) 0.001* (0.000) -0.002*** (0.000)
Amount to be won 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
High Treatment -0.076* (0.045) -0.048 (0.034) 0.001 (0.011) -0.009 (0.009)
Low Treatment -0.040 (0.039) -0.012 (0.032) 0.006 (0.010) 0.021*** (0.008)
Wealth Treatment -0.072* (0.039) -0.043 (0.028) -0.010 (0.008) 0.001 (0.007)
Guess the winner -0.036** (0.017) -0.041*** (0.015) -0.023*** (0.005) 0.032*** (0.004)
Experiment experience -0.007 (0.027) -0.037 (0.025) -0.028*** (0.008) 0.001 (0.006)
Gender (female=1) 0.001 (0.027) -0.015 (0.023) -0.020*** (0.007) 0.007 (0.005)
Age -0.037** (0.017) -0.028** (0.012) -0.018*** (0.005) -0.007 (0.005)
Age2 0.001** (0.000) 0.000** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Asian culture 0.069* (0.041) -0.004 (0.036) -0.015 (0.011) -0.032*** (0.012)
Other culture 0.096* (0.057) 0.019 (0.043) 0.014 (0.020) -0.043** (0.018)
Weekly Income Low -0.048 (0.036) -0.035 (0.029) -0.028*** (0.009) 0.055*** (0.007)
Weekly Income Avg. 0.068* (0.036) 0.051* (0.028) 0.026*** (0.008) 0.009 (0.006)
Weekly Income High -0.045 (0.034) -0.031 (0.026) 0.006 (0.009) -0.009 (0.007)
Wealth Level Avg. -0.053 (0.048) -0.047 (0.035) -0.001 (0.012) 0.045*** (0.010)
Wealth Level Poor -0.020 (0.053) -0.015 (0.039) 0.028** (0.012) 0.040*** (0.010)
Performance at Uni 0.037** (0.014) 0.014 (0.012) 0.011*** (0.003) -0.013*** (0.003)
International Student -0.002 (0.031) 0.031 (0.024) -0.002 (0.007) 0.005 (0.006)
English speaker 0.019 (0.030) -0.011 (0.023) -0.021*** (0.007) -0.000 (0.005)
Mum Schooled -0.017 (0.040) -0.057* (0.034) -0.037*** (0.009) 0.049*** (0.010)
Mum Qualified -0.044 (0.037) -0.022 (0.026) -0.008 (0.009) -0.032*** (0.008)
Mum Qual. Level 0.002 (0.027) 0.029 (0.022) 0.030*** (0.006) 0.007 (0.006)
Dad Schooled 0.087* (0.048) 0.084** (0.038) 0.035*** (0.010) -0.045*** (0.010)
Dad Qualified 0.065* (0.039) 0.014 (0.029) -0.004 (0.008) 0.007 (0.007)
Dad Qual. Level -0.032 (0.024) -0.017 (0.018) -0.010** (0.005) -0.025*** (0.004)
Risk-aversion (HL) 0.011** (0.005) 0.010*** (0.002) -0.009*** (0.001)
SBI: Reminisce (I) 0.020** (0.010) 0.009*** (0.003) -0.000 (0.002)
SBI: Anticipate (I) -0.013 (0.011) -0.003 (0.003) -0.018*** (0.002)
SBI: Moment (I) -0.012 (0.014) -0.019*** (0.004) 0.024*** (0.004)
Optimism: Disapp. 0.011** (0.005) 0.007*** (0.001) 0.002 (0.001)
Optimism: Low Exp. -0.001 (0.005) -0.001 (0.001) 0.002 (0.001)
Self Esteem (I) 0.008 (0.013) 0.016*** (0.004) -0.003 (0.004)
Locus of Control (I) 0.004 (0.008) -0.001 (0.002) 0.003** (0.002)
Happiness 0.010 (0.012) 0.013*** (0.003) -0.002 (0.004)
Lucky Charm 0.009 (0.008) 0.012*** (0.003) 0.000 (0.002)
BMI 0.007*** (0.002) 0.006*** (0.001) 0.001* (0.000)
Lefthanded 0.029 (0.045) 0.042*** (0.013) 0.017 (0.011)
Vegetarian 0.077 (0.055) 0.077*** (0.020) 0.055*** (0.019)
Alcohol -0.012 (0.022) -0.016** (0.006) 0.001 (0.005)
Smoking -0.027 (0.020) -0.038* (0.020) 0.088*** (0.019)
Depression -0.062* (0.032) 0.004 (0.010) -0.057*** (0.010)
Ambiguity -0.124** (0.050) -0.432*** (0.024) -0.291*** (0.014)
Ambig. X Obj. Prob. -0.764*** (0.070) -0.415*** (0.037) 0.301*** (0.028)
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F 24.502 51.246
Pr() > F 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 4194 4193 4193
Adj.R2 0.365 0.546
ll -118.01 595.72 1135.76
AIC 298.03 -1093.44 -2075.52
BIC 494.61 -782.72 -1454.09
Significance levels: * 0.1; ** 0.05; *** 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. (I) denotes
indexes built from sets of variables. See Appendix for further details on all control vari-
ables. The excluded reference categories are “Baseline Treatment”, “Australian Culture”,
“Weekly Income None”, and “Wealth Level Above”.
Table C.2: Structural ML estimates of probability function parameters report-
ing all the variables
(3) (4)
ln(σ)
Objectiv prob. -0.260*** (0.042) -0.251*** (0.044)
Pitstop -0.002 (0.014) 0.002 (0.014)
Race Number (1-6) 0.019*** (0.007) 0.025*** (0.007)
Amount wagered -0.015*** (0.004) -0.022*** (0.005)
Real-Effort Earnings -0.006** (0.002) -0.013*** (0.003)
Amount to be won 0.000 (0.001) 0.002*** (0.001)
High Treatment -0.040 (0.051) -0.060 (0.055)
Low Treatment -0.004 (0.040) 0.223*** (0.045)
Wealth Treatment -0.031 (0.039) -0.067 (0.045)
Guess the winner -0.000 (0.017) 0.052*** (0.020)
Experiment experience 0.122*** (0.036) 0.070* (0.037)
Gender (female=1) 0.176*** (0.029) 0.214*** (0.032)
Age -0.027 (0.021) -0.008 (0.021)
Age2 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
Asian culture 0.018 (0.049) 0.283*** (0.052)
Other culture 0.116 (0.085) 0.167* (0.093)
Weekly Income Low 0.198*** (0.036) 0.148*** (0.039)
Weekly Income Avg. 0.143*** (0.037) 0.044 (0.040)
Weekly Income High -0.066 (0.049) 0.003 (0.048)
Wealth Level Avg. 0.014 (0.060) -0.010 (0.063)
Wealth Level Poor 0.007 (0.064) -0.042 (0.069)
Performance at Uni 0.009 (0.014) -0.056*** (0.017)
International Student 0.156*** (0.036) 0.194*** (0.041)
English speaker 0.102*** (0.029) 0.040 (0.033)
Mum Schooled -0.020 (0.046) -0.147*** (0.054)
Mum Qualified -0.073* (0.044) -0.152** (0.062)
Mum Qual. Level 0.054 (0.033) 0.152*** (0.031)
Dad Schooled 0.164*** (0.050) -0.058 (0.052)
Dad Qualified -0.160*** (0.047) 0.119** (0.052)
Dad Qual. Level 0.028 (0.028) -0.100*** (0.029)
Risk-aversion (HL) -0.012 (0.009)
SBI: Reminisce (I) -0.054*** (0.016)
SBI: Anticipate (I) -0.053*** (0.016)
SBI: Moment (I) 0.083*** (0.018)
Optimism: Disapp. 0.000 (0.007)
Optimism: Low Exp. -0.011 (0.008)
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Self Esteem (I) -0.032 (0.020)
Locus of Control (I) 0.061*** (0.012)
Happiness -0.029 (0.020)







constant -1.201*** (0.285) -1.068*** (0.359)
ln(β)
Pitstop 0.070** (0.032) 0.010 (0.030)
Race Number (1-6) 0.061*** (0.014) 0.071*** (0.011)
Amount wagered 0.049*** (0.007) 0.026*** (0.008)
Real-Effort Earnings 0.016*** (0.005) 0.006 (0.005)
Amount to be won -0.002*** (0.001) -0.001* (0.001)
High Treatment 0.411*** (0.115) 0.699*** (0.091)
Low Treatment 0.177** (0.074) 0.662*** (0.079)
Wealth Treatment 0.338*** (0.079) 0.666*** (0.074)
Guess the winner 0.155*** (0.041) 0.111*** (0.033)
Experiment experience -0.079 (0.069) -0.012 (0.065)
Gender (female=1) 0.163*** (0.058) 0.202*** (0.050)
Age 0.105*** (0.036) 0.309*** (0.034)
Age2 -0.002*** (0.001) -0.005*** (0.001)
Asian culture 0.001 (0.088) -0.078 (0.085)
Other culture -0.137 (0.154) -0.551*** (0.145)
Weekly Income Low 0.064 (0.088) 0.303*** (0.067)
Weekly Income Avg. -0.287*** (0.090) -0.125* (0.067)
Weekly Income High 0.431*** (0.098) 0.520*** (0.078)
Wealth Level Avg. 0.355*** (0.098) 0.021 (0.103)
Wealth Level Poor 0.282** (0.113) -0.156 (0.107)
Performance at Uni 0.085** (0.033) -0.035 (0.030)
International Student -0.209*** (0.070) -0.200*** (0.070)
English speaker 0.013 (0.066) -0.146** (0.063)
Mum Schooled 0.017 (0.080) 0.059 (0.083)
Mum Qualified 0.062 (0.089) -0.101 (0.068)
Mum Qual. Level 0.075 (0.057) 0.048 (0.048)
Dad Schooled -0.466*** (0.086) -0.639*** (0.087)
Dad Qualified 0.503*** (0.093) 0.164** (0.074)
Dad Qual. Level -0.224*** (0.062) 0.028 (0.048)
Risk-aversion (HL) 0.002 (0.012)
SBI: Reminisce (I) -0.183*** (0.024)
SBI: Anticipate (I) 0.032 (0.021)
SBI: Moment (I) 0.032 (0.033)
Optimism: Disapp. -0.067*** (0.011)
Optimism: Low Exp. 0.024* (0.013)
Self Esteem (I) 0.006 (0.036)
Locus of Control (I) 0.105*** (0.019)
Happiness 0.170*** (0.036)








constant -4.120*** (0.531) -5.242*** (0.658)
logit(γ)
Pitstop 0.186*** (0.038) 0.003 (0.035)
Race Number (1-6) -0.002 (0.019) -0.033* (0.018)
Amount wagered 0.046** (0.019) -0.171*** (0.037)
Real-Effort Earnings -0.012* (0.007) 0.017 (0.012)
Amount to be won 0.006** (0.003) 0.024*** (0.007)
High Treatment -0.058 (0.149) 0.432* (0.233)
Low Treatment 0.176 (0.126) 2.199*** (0.344)
Wealth Treatment 0.054 (0.108) 0.795*** (0.145)
Guess the winner -0.251*** (0.056) -0.199** (0.078)
Experiment experience -0.213* (0.120) -1.193*** (0.170)
Gender (female=1) 0.227** (0.091) 0.211* (0.113)
Age -0.234** (0.103) 0.051 (0.136)
Age2 0.006*** (0.002) 0.001 (0.003)
Asian culture 0.487*** (0.119) 1.150*** (0.224)
Other culture 0.672 (0.428) 1.098** (0.465)
Weekly Income Low -0.280** (0.117) 0.000 (0.205)
Weekly Income Avg. -0.006 (0.126) 0.457*** (0.173)
Weekly Income High 0.343** (0.151) 2.417*** (0.288)
Wealth Level Avg. -0.047 (0.172) -1.726*** (0.450)
Wealth Level Poor -0.042 (0.196) -0.966** (0.412)
Performance at Uni 0.432*** (0.057) -0.097 (0.065)
International Student -0.454*** (0.092) -0.364*** (0.121)
English speaker 0.065 (0.092) -0.863*** (0.130)
Mum Schooled -0.014 (0.112) -0.913*** (0.172)
Mum Qualified -0.251** (0.113) -0.575*** (0.185)
Mum Qual. Level -0.109 (0.074) 0.392*** (0.105)
Dad Schooled -0.183 (0.119) -0.063 (0.266)
Dad Qualified 1.561*** (0.168) 1.011*** (0.254)
Dad Qual. Level -0.466*** (0.101) -0.571*** (0.127)
Risk-aversion (HL) 0.178*** (0.034)
SBI: Reminisce (I) -0.047 (0.067)
SBI: Anticipate (I) -0.463*** (0.058)
SBI: Moment (I) 0.289*** (0.082)
Optimism: Disapp. -0.030 (0.019)
Optimism: Low Exp. 0.070** (0.030)
Self Esteem (I) -0.398*** (0.122)
Locus of Control (I) 0.337*** (0.038)
Happiness 0.874*** (0.135)







constant 1.338 (1.130) -8.647*** (2.196)
η
constant 0.312*** (0.036) 0.407*** (0.070)
N 4194 4194
ll 209.341 716.767
Significance levels: * 0.1; ** 0.05; *** 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. (I) de-
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notes indexes build from sets of variables. See Appendix for further details on all control
variables. The excluded reference categories are “Baseline Treatment”, “Australian Cul-
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Figure C.1: Models fit under different levels of ambiguity
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